Retroactive Change in the Law to Punish a Defendant by Schoenwaelder, George
Touro Law Review 
Volume 30 




Retroactive Change in the Law to Punish a Defendant 
George Schoenwaelder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Schoenwaelder, George (2014) "Retroactive Change in the Law to Punish a Defendant," Touro Law Review: 
Vol. 30 : No. 4 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/6 
This Ex Post Facto is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
 
961 
RETROACTIVE CHANGE IN THE LAW TO PUNISH A 
DEFENDANT 
JUSTICE COURT OF NEW YORK 
TOWN OF EAST ROCHESTER, MONROE COUNTY 
 
People v. Luther1 
(decided June 30, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The court in People v. Luther granted the defendant’s Crimi-
nal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 440.10 motion to vacate the prior plea 
of guilty to Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”) because it violated 
the basic principles of justice.2  The court failed to answer whether 
the retroactive Department of Motor Vehicles Emergency Regulation 
§ 136.5 was actually an ex post facto law.3  The Supreme Court of the 
United States has stated that “every statute, which takes away or im-
pairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new ob-
ligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect 
to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retro-
spective.”4  Article I, § 10 clause 1 of United States Constitution5 
prohibits any state from enacting an ex post facto law.6  The Court 
has held that a law that “changes the punishment, and inflicts a great-
er punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed,”7 
 
1 970 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Just. Ct. 2013). 
2 Id. at 681. 
3 Id. 
4 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; 
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of 
Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 
6 Luther, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 678. 
7 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
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violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.8  
The retroactive emergency regulation at issue in this case increased 
the mandatory ineligibility to hold a driver’s license to two years, 
which quadrupled the previous punishment of a mandatory six 
months.9 
On August 5, 2012, the defendant was charged with his third 
DWI.10  The other DWI offenses occurred within the previous twen-
ty-five years, one in 1990 and the other in 1993.11  On February 11, 
2012, following discovery, the defendant accepted a plea bargain and 
pled guilty to DWI, a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 
1192(3).12  The plea bargain entailed a “mandatory six month suspen-
sion of his driver’s license,” along with other various punishments.13  
However, on March 14, 2012, the defendant moved to set aside the 
plea bargain.14 
The defendant’s main argument to set aside the plea bargain 
was that, when he entered into the plea, he reasonably believed that 
he would be able to apply to have his license restored after the man-
datory six-month suspension period.15  On February 22, 2012, shortly 
after the defendant’s plea bargain, the New York Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles (“DMV”) retroactively amended Emergency Regulation 
§ 136.5, which made it clear that a plea to a third DWI within twenty-
five years would result in the loss of a person’s license well beyond 
the mandatory six-month suspension.16  The new retroactive regula-
tion made the defendant ineligible “to apply for a new license until 
two years after the six month revocation.”17  The new regulation im-
posed a much harsher punishment against the defendant than what he 
had originally agreed to in his plea.18  Upon realizing the impact of 
the new emergency regulation, the defendant’s new counsel moved to 
have the plea bargain set aside.19 
 
8 Luther, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 680. 
9 Id. at 681. 
10 Id. at 675. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Luther, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 675. 
14 Id. at 676. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 677. 
17 Id. 
18 Luther, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 677. 
19 Id. 
2
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The assistant district attorney (“ADA”) argued that the de-
fendant did not meet the expressly specified elements of CPL § 
440.10 motion to vacate a plea.20  The ADA also argued that the plea 
bargain did not include a specified date that the defendant would be 
able to get his license back after the mandatory six-month revoca-
tion.21  However, the court set aside the plea bargain because the 
judgment was obtained against the right of the defendant under the 
constitution of New York, as well as the constitution of the United 
States.22  The court stated the revised emergency regulation put into 
effect after the plea would retroactively apply to the defendant and 
warranted sufficient issues to grant the defendant’s CPL § 440.10 
motion.23 
The court stated that it allowed the defendant to vacate his 
prior plea “based upon the ex post facto character and retroactive ef-
fect of the amended DMV regulation § 136.5.”24  The classic example 
of an ex post facto law is when a person engages in an act that is law-
ful at the time engaged in, but the act retroactively becomes unlaw-
ful.25  There is no doubt that the DWI was an illegal act at the time of 
the defendant’s arrest.26  However, an additional category of an ex 
post facto law is “a law that imposes additional and harsher conse-
quences than existed at the time of the offense,”27 which appears to 
be the situation in Luther.  It is often the case that ex post facto laws 
are at issue when a state tries to pass a law quickly or retroactively.28 
II. HISTORY OF EX POST FACTO LAWS 
Ex post facto literally means done or made after the fact; hav-
ing retroactive force or effect.29  The Ex Post Facto Clause appears in 
the United States Constitution in Article I, § 9, clause 3 stating “No 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,”30 and in the 
 
20 Id. at 678. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Luther, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 678. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 679. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Luther, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
29
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (8th ed. 2006). 
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
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United States Constitution Article I, § 10, clause 1, in which the ap-
plicable part states “No State shall enter into any . . . ex post facto 
Law.”31 
Calder v. Bull,32 a landmark case dealing with the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, set up four different categories of ex post facto laws: 
[First,]
 
Every law that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when 
done, criminal; and punishes such action.  [Second,] 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater 
than it was, when committed.  [Third,] Every law that 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punish-
ment, than the law annexed to the crime, when com-
mitted.  [Fourth,] Every law that alters the legal rules 
of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, 
than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offence, in order to convict the offender.  All the-
se, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppres-
sive.33 
Justice Chase implied that the Framers of the United States Constitu-
tion incorporated two ex post facto clauses to avoid the acts of vio-
lence and injustice that Parliament of Great Britain exercised over 
American citizens.34  The Court expressed “that no man should be 
compelled to do what the laws do not require.”35 
III. SUPREME COURT DEALING WITH EX POST FACTO LAWS 
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,36 the petitioner brought 
suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming a co-
worker sexually harassed her.37  The district court found the sexual 
harassment did not justify her decision to resign.38  Therefore, the pe-
titioner was not terminated in violation of Title VII and was not enti-
 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
32 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
33 Id. at 390-91. 
34 Id. at 389. 
35 Id. at 388. 
36 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
37 Id. at 248. 
38 Id. 
4
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tled to equitable relief.39  While awaiting appeal, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 retroactively went into effect.40  The petitioner wanted the 
Court of Appeals to remand her case for a jury trial on damages pur-
suant to the new Act of 1991.41  The Court of Appeals rejected the 
petitioner’s request on the premise that “a court must apply the law in 
effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result 
in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative histo-
ry to the contrary.”42  The Supreme Court of the United States grant-
ed certiorari to determine whether § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 applied to cases pending when it became law.43 
The Court stated that “[e]lementary considerations of fairness 
dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the 
law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations 
should not be lightly disrupted.”44  Retroactive statutes and regula-
tions allow the legislature to take away settled expectations immedi-
ately without individualized consideration.45  The legislature is faced 
with political pressures, which “pose[] a risk that it may be tempted 
to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpop-
ular groups or individuals.”46  The ex post facto clause was drafted to 
ensure that individuals have “fair warning” about the effect of crimi-
nal statutes, but also “restricts governmental power by restraining ar-
bitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.”47 
Although retroactive laws can cause controversy, unfairness 
of a retroactive law is an insufficient reason for a court to not give the 
retroactive law its intended meaning.48  Retroactivity provisions usu-
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 249; see Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (noting it expanded the monetary relief 
available to plaintiffs and also allowed monetary relief for some workplace discrimination 
that would not previously have justified any relief under Title VII). 
41 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 249. 
42 Id. (quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)). 
43 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 249-50.  The Court assumed “that if the same conduct were to 
occur today, petitioner would be entitled to jury trail and that the jury might find that she was 
constructively discharged, or that her mental anguish or other injuries would support an 
award of damages against her former employer.”  Id. 
44 Id.; see General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (“Retroactive legis-
lation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective 
legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled trans-
actions.”). 
45 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 267; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). 
48 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267. 
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ally serve good-natured and legitimate purposes, “whether to respond 
to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention of a 
new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or 
simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers 
salutary.”49  It is important that Congress makes its intentions unam-
biguous in a retroactive law and must weigh the benefits of the retro-
active law against the potential for unfairness.50 
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after 
the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine 
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the stat-
ute’s proper reach.  If Congress has done so, of course 
there is no need to resort to judicial default rules.  
When, however, the statute contains no such express 
command, the court must determine whether the new 
statute would have retroactive effect. i.e., whether it 
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose 
new duties with respect to transactions already com-
pleted.  If the statute would operate retroactively, our 
traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern 
absent clear congressional intent favoring such a re-
sult.51 
It is clear that the Court was required to first look at whether § 
102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply to cases before its 
enactment because Congress did not give any instruction about the 
Act’s proper reach.52  Section 102 of the Act provides a victim with 
new rights to relief that were not available under Title VII, which on-
ly authorized back pay in some cases.53  If § 102 did apply to cases 
before its enactment, it would make employers liable for past 
events.54  The Court had never “read a statute substantially increasing 
the monetary liability of a private party to apply to conduct occurring 
before the statute’s enactment.”55  Although reading § 102 retroac-
 
49 Id. at 267-68. 
50 Id. at 268. 
51 Id. at 280. 
52 Id. 
53 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 284; see Winfree v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 296, 301 (1913) (noting a statute 
creating new federal cause of action for wrongful death inapplicable to case arising before 
6
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tively would help the petitioner in this case, there is no clear evidence 
it should apply to cases before it was enacted.56  If the Act were im-
posed retroactively, it would increase the liability of employers for 
past conduct and therefore raise an ex post facto clause issue.57 
In Stogner v. California,58 the state enacted § 1 of Chapter 
390 of the California Statute (amended as California Penal Code 
§803(g)(3)(A)),
59
 in 1993; a new criminal statute related to sexually 
abused children.60  The new statute made it clear that prosecution 
could revive any sexual abuse case if it met the three conditions of 
the statute.61  The statute allowed prosecutors to seek criminal pun-
ishment for acts committed many years before, which had previously 
been time barred by statute of limitations.62 
In 1998, Marion Strogner was indicted in California for sex-
related child abuse which he committed nearly thirty-to-forty years 
prior.63  At the time of the alleged sexual abuse, the statute of limita-
tions was only three years.64  However, the new statute allowed state 
prosecutors to seek a cause of action in Stogner’s case.65  Stogner ar-
gued for the dismissal of the case based on the theory that it violated 
the Federal Constitution’s ex post facto clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause; however, the trial court denied his 
motion, and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial.66  The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the constitu-
tional claims asserted by Stogner.67 
The Court made it clear that the California statute was in di-
 
enactment in absence of “explicit words” or “clear implication”). 
56 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285. 
57 Id. 
58 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
59 CAL. STATS. CH. 390, § 1(1993). 
60 Stonger, 539 U.S. at 609. 
61 Id. 
The new statute permits for prosecution crimes that the statute of limita-
tions is expired, provided that (1) a victim has reported an allegation of 
abuse to the police, (2) there is independent evidence that clearly and 
convincingly corroborates the victim’s allegation, and (3) the prosecu-
tion is begun within one year of the victim’s report. 
Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Stogner, 539 U.S. at 609. 
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rect conflict with what the ex post facto clause sought to avoid.68  The 
Court has held in prior cases that “extending a limitations period after 
the State has assured ‘a man that he has become safe from its pursuit . 
. . seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.’ ”69  It also seems that 
the ex post facto law in this case fell directly under the one of main 
categories of ex post facto laws stated in Calder v. Bull.70  Although 
Stogner was liable for his crime before the statute of limitations ran 
out, it appears he was no longer liable for punishment once the three 
years had passed.71  The Court stated that it has long been settled that 
the ex post facto clause “forbids resurrection of a time-barred prose-
cution.”72 
IV. SECOND CIRCUIT DEALING WITH EX POST FACTO 
In Doe v. Pataki,73 three prior sex offenders claimed New 
York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) was an ex post fac-
to violation.74  The SORA statute, which became effective on January 
21, 1996, retroactively applied and required sex offenders to register 
with law enforcement officials, and provided for different degrees of 
public notification of identity and address after serving their sentenc-
es.75  SORA applied “to sex offenders incarcerated or on parole or 
probation on its effective date, as well as to those sentenced thereaf-
ter, thereby imposing its obligations on many persons whose crimes 
 
68 Stogner, 539 U.S. at 610. 
69 Id. at 611 (quoting Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
70 Stogner, 539 U.S. at 612. 
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and 
the intent of the prohibition.  1st. . Every law that makes an action done 
before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, crim-
inal; and punishes such action.  2d.  Every law that aggravates a crime, 
or makes it greater than it was, when committed.  3d.  Every law that 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th.  Every law that alters the 
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than 
the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 
convict the offender.  All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust 
and oppressive. 
Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. 
71 Stogner, 539 U.S. at 613. 
72 Id. at 616. 
73 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997). 
74 Id. at 1265. 
75 Id. 
8
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were committed prior to the effective date.”76  The three sex offend-
ers committed their crimes prior to the effective date of SORA and 
asserted SORA increased the punishment imposed on them at the 
time of their offense, which was a violation of the ex post facto 
clause.77 
SORA provided that all convicted sex offenders must register 
with law enforcement and that law enforcement may notify the public 
about where the sex offender resides and background information 
about the sexual offense committed.78  The two main goals of SORA 
were “(1) protecting members of the community, particularly their 
children, by notifying them of the presence of individuals in their 
midst who may present a danger, and (2) enhancing law enforcement 
authorities’ ability to investigate and prosecute future sex crimes.”79  
Any sexual offender who failed to register with the proper authority 
under SORA would face criminal charges.80 
The district court concluded the main question of the “case is 
whether, as the [sex offenders] contend, [SORA] increases the ‘pun-
ishment’ for sex offenses, or whether, as the [state legislature] con-
tends, [SORA] merely regulates by protecting the public.”81  The dis-
trict court applied a four-part test to resolve the question of whether 
the registration and notification was in fact an ex post facto viola-
tion.82  The district court, relying on the ex post facto argument, is-
sued a permanent injunction against SORA, which denied the state 
legislature from enforcing the public notification of SORA against 
sexual offenders before January 21, 1996.83  However, the district 
court did not find the retroactive application of SORA registration to 
conflict with the ex post facto clause.84  The Second Circuit had to 
decide whether the notification and registration for SORA increased 
the sex offenders’ punishment for their prior sexual offenses.85 
 
76 Id. at 1266. 
77 Id. 
78 Doe, 120 F.3d at 1266. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1267-68.  An offender who fails to register is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for 
the offense, and is guilty of a class D felony for each subsequent offense.  Id. at 1266.  
81 Id. at 1271. 
82 Doe, 120 F.3d at 1271.  Four part test which was applied: “(1) legislative intent, (2) 
statutory design, (3) historical analogies, and (4) effect of the statute.”  Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1272. 
9
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The Second Circuit looked at whether the retroactively im-
posed burden placed on sex offenders constituted a punishment with-
in the meaning of ex post facto clause.86  The court looked at the pur-
pose to be served by SORA to see if it was constitutionally 
prohibited.87  First, the ex post facto clause ensures that legislative 
acts “give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely 
on their meaning until explicitly changed.”88  Second, the ex post fac-
to clause “erects a barrier to legislative abuses in the form of arbitrary 
or vindictive legislation directed against disfavored groups.”89 
The court found there was sufficient information to find the 
legislature intended SORA to be a nonpunitive punishment.90  It 
found that the legislature’s intent was “protecting communities by 
notifying them of the presence of individuals who may present a dan-
ger and enhancing law enforcement authorities’ ability to fight sex 
crimes.”91  The court recognized the importance of protecting chil-
dren, a vulnerable group, from potential harm.92  The New York Leg-
islature enacted SORA retroactively to “protect the public from po-
tentially dangerous persons.”93  The court, therefore, concluded that 
the sex offenders failed to show evidence that SORA had a punitive 
intent.94  “[N]othing in its text suggests that the legislature sought to 
punish sex offenders for their past offenses rather than to prevent any 
future harms that they might cause, and several of its features mani-
fest a nonpunitive purpose.”95 
Next, the court examined whether the notification requirement 
had a punitive intent under the ex post facto clause.96  The court not-
ed “that although notification conveys to the public the information 
that prompts some people to take unlawful action against the convict-
ed sex offender, it is the offender’s prior conviction—or, more pre-
cisely, the offender’s criminal act itself—that motivates such hostile 
 
86 Doe, 120 F.3d at 1273. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29). 
89 Id.; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (ruling that responsivity to political pressures 
poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution 
against unpopular groups or individuals). 
90 Doe, 120 F.3d at 1276. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1277. 
94 Id. 
95 Doe, 120 F.3d at 1278. 
96 Id. at 1279. 
10
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action.”97  The court, therefore, held that “SORA’s notification provi-
sions are reasonably related to the nonpunitive, prospective goals of 
protecting the public and facilitating law enforcement efforts, and 
that the Act’s occasionally imprecise targeting does not suffice to 
render it punitive.”98  The fact that SORA “may serve civil as well as 
criminal goals” is not enough to indicate it is punitive in nature.99 
V. DEALING WITH EX POST FACTO LAWS IN NEW YORK 
In People v. Ballman,100 the court looked at whether the 
amended Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8) allowed the court to 
look at a defendant’s prior out-of-state DWI conviction that occurred 
before November 1, 2006.101  The statute was amended to allow out-
of-state convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs to be used as convictions as if the action took place in New 
York, so that repeat DWI offenders would not be let off the hook be-
cause a previous conviction of DWI happened outside of New 
York.102  Prior to the 2006 amendment of the statute, out-of-state 
convictions for DWI were treated as only traffic infractions under 
New York law.103 
 
97 Id. at 1280. 
98 Id. at 1281-82. 
99 Id. at 1283. 
100 904 N.Y.S.2d 361 (2d Cir. 2010). 
101 Id.; 
8. Effect of prior out-of-state conviction. A prior out-of-state conviction 
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs shall be deemed to be a prior conviction of a violation of this sec-
tion for purposes of determining penalties imposed under this section or 
for purposes of any administrative action required to be taken pursuant 
to subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-three of this article; 
provided, however, that such conduct, had it occurred in this state, would 
have constituted a misdemeanor or felony violation of any of the provi-
sions of this section.  Provided, however, that if such conduct, had it oc-
curred in this state, would have constituted a violation of any provisions 
of this section which are not misdemeanor or felony offenses, then such 
conduct shall be deemed to be a prior conviction of a violation of subdi-
vision one of this section for purposes of determining penalties imposed 
under this section or for purposes of any administrative action required 
to be taken pursuant to subdivision two of section eleven hundred nine-
ty-three of this article. 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1192 (McKinney 2012). 
102 Ballman, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 362. 
103 Id. 
11
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The defendant in this case was indicted on a felony DWI for 
his actions on February 22, 2007.104  The prosecution based its felony 
charge on the fact that the defendant had been convicted in the state 
of Georgia in 1999 for driving with an unlawful alcohol concentra-
tion.105  The defendant moved to dismiss the felony indictment on the 
grounds that the date of Georgia conviction was well before the stat-
ute was amended, making the DWI charge ineligible for a felony up-
grade.106  The county court denied the motion; however, the Appel-
late Division reversed and dismissed the felony DWI charges.107  The 
court concluded that “the 2006 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic 
Law § 1192(8) and its enabling language, convictions occurring prior 
to the November 1, 2006 effective date of statute, including defend-
ant’s 1999 Georgia conviction, could not be used to raise a DWI of-
fense from a misdemeanor to a felony.”108 
It is clear that the purpose of the 2006 amendment to the stat-
ute was to “eliminate one of the loopholes that allow[ed] repeat DWI 
offenders to face lesser penalties simply because prior convictions 
occurred out of state.”109  The 2006 amendment ended the practice of 
treating all prior out-of-state DWI convictions as mere traffic infrac-
tions under New York law.110  “Legislature recognized the harsher 
penalties that had been applied when a person had a prior in-state 
conviction, as opposed to a prior out-of-state conviction, and intend-
ed to remedy that discrepancy.”111  It is clear that the legislature 
wanted to fix this discrepancy, but knew there was potential to cause 
an ex post facto issue.112  “[T]he legislature chose to remedy this dif-
ferential treatment going forward, by continuing to apply the previous 
statutory scheme to out-of-state convictions occurring prior to No-
vember 1, 2006, and applying the statute as amended to out-of-state 
convictions occurring after the date.”113  This interpretation of the 





107 Ballman, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 362. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 364. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Ballman, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 364. 
113 Id. 
12
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in 1999 could not apply to his present DWI case.114 
In People v. Maldonado,115 the defendant pled guilty to two 
counts of DWI, which was sufficient to charge him with a class D 
felony pursuant to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2).116  
The DWI offenses occurred on July 18, 1991 and October 9, 1991.117  
The defendant moved to dismiss the guilty pleas on the grounds that 
the “newly enacted [Vehicle and Traffic Law] § 1193(1)(c)(ii) re-
quires that the pleas were entered and that sentence upon the two 
predicate DWI convictions must have been imposed at different times 
to elevate the present charge of operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol to a class D felony.”118 
The defendant believed his two pleas should be taken as one, 
making it insufficient to charge him with a class D felony as prohibit-
ed under ex post facto laws.119 
The court held that the “enhanced sentencing provision did 
not violate the ex post facto clause even where the prior conviction 
was not classified as a violent felony offense at the time it was sus-
tained by the defendant.”120  The court explained that it considered 
 
114 Id. 
115 661 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
116 Id. at 938; 
Driving while intoxicated; per se.  No person shall operate a motor vehi-
cle while such person has .08 of one per centum or more by weight of al-
cohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such per-
son's blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of 
section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article. 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1192 (McKinney 2012). 
117 Maldonado, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 938. 
118 Id.; 
(ii) A person who operates a vehicle in violation of subdivision two, 
two-a, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this 
article after having been convicted of a violation of subdivision two, 
two-a, three, four or four-a of such section or of vehicular assault in the 
second or first degree, as defined, respectively, in sections 120.03 and 
120.04 and aggravated vehicular assault as defined in section 120.04-a of 
the penal law or of vehicular manslaughter in the second or first degree, 
as defined, respectively, in sections 125.12 and 125.13 and aggravated 
vehicular homicide as defined in section 125.14 of such law, twice with-
in the preceding ten years, shall be guilty of a class D felony, and shall 
be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars nor more than 
ten thousand dollars or by a period of imprisonment as provided in the 
penal law, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1193 (McKinney 2012). 
119 Maldonado, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 939. 
120 Id. at 941; see People v. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the 
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the latest DWI crime as an aggravated offense allowing for a harsher 
penalty to deter repeat DWI offenders.121  Increasing the penalty for a 
DWI for a defendant’s repetitive conduct does not violate the provi-
sion against ex post facto laws.122 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It appears unambiguously that the court in People v. Luther 
recognized it was dealing with a potential ex post facto problem if it 
had not granted the defendant’s motion to vacate the prior plea of 
guilty to DWI.  Instead of addressing the Ex Post Facto Clause ques-
tion, it vacated the defendant’s prior plea.  However, the retroactive 
nature of the Department of Motor Vehicles Emergency Regulation § 
136.5 may still be questioned by future defendants as applying a pu-
nitive punishment.  Increasing the mandatory suspension of a per-
son’s driver’s license appears to be punishing a defendant, rather than 
protecting the public.  There is no doubt that DWI is a serious of-
fense; however, increasing the punishment after a defendant takes a 





provisions for mandatory enhanced prison sentences for violent felony offenders did not vio-
late the restriction against ex post facto laws). 
121 Maldonado, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 941. 
122 Id. 
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